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Party Capability and the
US Courts of Appeals
UNDERSTANDING WHY THE “HAVES” WIN
J O H N S Z M E R , University of North Carolina–Charlotte
DON A L D R . S O N G E R , University of South Carolina
J E N N I F E R B OW I E , University of Richmond
ABSTRACT
While many studies have examined party capability theory, few have empirically examined the potential
causal mechanisms underlying the theory. We do this by combining quantitative analyses with qualitative
data drawn from interviews with over 60 US courts of appeals judges. We find that the “haves,” or repeat
players, hire better lawyers and that these lawyers independently contribute to the success of the repeat
players.We also find that the advantages of the haves extend to all parties, though to a lesser extent than the
advantages enjoyed by the US government. These results remain robust after controlling for ideology.
INTRODUCTION
Many would argue that the central concern of political science has been “who wins?”
ðLasswell 1936Þ. This is reflected in Lasswell’s famous definition of politics as “who gets
what, when, and how?” To answer this question often requires an examination of the
participants in the so-called competition. In a similar vein, how party capability influ-
ences judicial behavior has interested scholars and practitioners of judicial decision
making ðGalanter 1974; McGuire 1998; Kritzer 2003Þ. Party capability theory assumes
that litigants with certain characteristics ðe.g., prior litigation experience and substantial
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financial resourcesÞ have several advantages when facing less capable litigants and these
advantages may influence judicial behavior.1
Despite all the studies that have empirically examined party capability, it is surprising
how little is actually known about its effects on judicial decision making. Few studies, if
any, have comprehensively explored the causal mechanisms underlying the theory. Be-
cause of the importance of the US courts of appeals and their participants ðjudges and
attorneysÞ, we fill the gap in the literature. To do this we empirically examine the causal
mechanisms underlying party capability in these intermediate courts and include the
perspectives of court of appeals judges. This approach will allow us to understand the ex-
tent to which the “haves’ ” success is attributable to their lawyers, the extent to which the
general success of the haves is primarily a function of the success of the “government go-
rilla,” whether the observed advantages are actually due to ideology, and the ways in which
repeat player haves are able to control which cases are appealed to the appellate courts.
First, advocates of party capability theory generally assume that the haves are more
likely to hire attorneys with high levels of expertise. But there is little actual evidence that
haves employ better attorneys.We begin our inquiry by testing this conventional wisdom.
Next, we test whether litigants represented by attorneys with higher levels of expertise
than opposing counsel are more likely than other litigants to be supported by judges.
From here we test whether repeat player haves possess other advantages that increase
their chances of winning when facing off against nonrepeat player “have-nots,” even after
controlling for the effects of attorney quality. In what follows, we test several alternative
causal mechanisms underlying party capability theory. For example, we assess the extent
to which Kritzer’s ð2003Þ theory of the dominance of the government gorilla provides
an adequate explanation of the previous findings on party capability. Specifically, what is
the extent of the US advantage? Are other parties with resource advantages similarly
successful? Next, is the success of relatively higher-status litigants due to ideological pre-
dispositions of judges to outcomes that benefit the haves in society? Finally, we discuss the
degree to which the advantages of party capability are a function of the ability to select
more winnable cases.
By examining several causal mechanisms in one setting, we attempt to distinguish
between the different theoretical linkages. This is particularly important given the overlap
between various explanations. Using original and existing data, we examine the influence
party capability has on case outcomes from a quantitative and qualitative perspective.
Rather than simply providing another analysis that demonstrates that repeat player haves
are more successful than the have-nots, we explore the potential casual mechanisms that
produce those higher success rates.
To summarize, we first lay out the basic party capability theory, summarize the existing
literature, and then develop and test series of hypotheses resulting from our summary of
1. It has been the subject of an entire journal issue ðLaw and Society Review 1999, vol. 33, no. 4Þ,
as well as at least one edited book ðKritzer and Silbey 2003Þ.
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the literature integrated with insights drawn from our interviews with more than 60 US
courts of appeals judges.
THE BASICS OF PARTY CAPABILITY THEORY
Most party capability studies have built on the theoretical foundation established by
Galanter’s ð1974Þ seminal work. Galanter used the simplest terms to define two types of
advantaged litigants: haves and repeat players. “Haves” are parties with more resources
and repeat players have more litigation experience. While the two categories do not com-
pletely overlap—Galanter discusses the recidivist criminal as the perfect example of the
have-not repeat player—they are likely highly correlated. The ideal repeat player, however,
has resources and experience ðGalanter 1974, 98Þ. At the most basic level, the key insight
of Galanter is that when haves face have-nots in court, the former tend to win more
frequently than other litigants.
Among other advantages, repeat players have the institutional knowledge and re-
sources to preemptively change the rules. Galanter ð1974Þ and later Kritzer ð2003Þ ex-
plain how governments have an obvious advantage in this context. Experience also ben-
efits the repeat player to the extent that it develops a favorable relationship with other
institutional actors in the legal system. One aspect of this relationship is the enhanced
credibility of the repeat player, which must act sincerely or risk future sanctions from
judges. This reciprocal relationship works as follows: given the probability that repeat
players will reappear before the judge, they are less likely to present facts and legal rules in
an overly biased fashion; knowing this, and having repeatedly observed this pattern of
behavior in prior interactions, the judge’s trust in the repeat player increases; therefore,
judges, in need of information, attach greater weight to facts and interpretations of rules
presented by repeat players ðGalanter 1974Þ.2 As such, to the extent that facts and rules
influence the judges, the increased credibility resulting from litigation experience will
influence legal outcomes ðMcGuire 1995Þ.
Party capability in appellate courts. While Galanter developed his theories to explain
behavior at the trial court level, the underlying logic, including the importance of resources
and experience, has been extended to appellate courts. Party capability theory has been
tested in many contexts, including the US Supreme Court ðUlmer 1985; Sheehan,
Mishler, and Songer 1992Þ and courts of appeals ðSonger, Sheehan, and Haire 1999Þ,
as well as state supreme courts ðWheeler et al. 1987; Songer, Kuersten, andKaheny 2000Þ.
The basic hypothesis has also been extended to courts in other nations, including
2. It is important to note that Galanter ð1974Þ never asserts that repeat players will always win.
Instead, he contends that repeat players are more likely to achieve their eventual goals in part because
they may sacrifice the occasional legal confrontation if it will produce long-term success. However,
while this logic does not buttress a deterministic relationship between party capability and litigation
success, it still supports a probabilistic theory. Despite the contention that a successful long-term
strategy could lead to occasional losses along the way to achieving their final goals, it is difficult to
envisage a successful litigation strategy that resulted in more losses than victories.
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England ðAtkins 1991Þ, Canada ðMcCormick 1993Þ, Australia ðSmyth 2000Þ, and the
Philippines ðHaynie 1994Þ.
Using the taxonomy derived by Galanter ð1974, 107Þ, these studies almost always
assign parties to one of several categories based on organizational characteristics. Typically,
governmental units are lumped into one or more categories, as are individual persons,
business associations, and interest groups ðe.g., Sheehan et al. 1992; Songer and Sheehan
1992Þ. The categories are ordered on the basis of an assumed hierarchy of financial re-
sources and litigation experience.While the number and order of the categories often vary
across studies, most place the largest governmental litigants at the top of the hierarchy,
with individual persons at the bottom. An assortment of the other categories usually
occupies the middle of the ranking, though the number and order vary among studies.
While the party typology measure is valuable for its efficiency—it is a relatively easy
measure to construct reliably, and it is a valid measure of the combination of advantages
that constitute the overall concept—it does have its limitations.3 Specifically, by itself, one
cannot parcel out the various posited advantages of the repeat player. In other words, it
does not enable us to examine many of the causal linkages between repeat player status
and litigation outcomes. In the remainder of this article, we seek to test some of the most
interesting relationships suggested but not systematically tested by Galanter.
IDENTIFYING THE CAUSAL LINKAGES BETWEEN
LITIGANT STATUS AND SUCCESS
To identify some of the key mechanisms that may lead to the success of repeat players, we
relied on two sources: previous studies using a party capability framework ðincluding the
original work of Galanter ½1974Þ and interviews with 60 US courts of appeals judges,
including at least one from every circuit.4 We organize the analysis and discussion around
several questions related to litigant status and success.5 In each instance we explain the
view from the bench and then follow with an empirical examination of the hypotheses
set out.
3. Since the parties’ names are listed in the headings of the cases, a party typology variable can
be constructed without having to examine exogenous material. With respect to alternative measures, as
Songer et al. ð1999Þ note, judicial decisions rarely contain specific information about the resources
of the parties. Moreover, to the extent that they do contain useful information, it is unlikely that they
would be comparable across categories, a problem that may be endemic to other more sophisticated
measures of resources.
4. The interviews took place over a span of 10 years ð2004–14Þ. Most of the interviews took
place at the judges’ chambers, although some took place at the Second and Ninth Circuit annual
judicial circuit conferences and a few by phone. The interviews typically lasted anywhere from 30 to
60 minutes and took on a conversational format. As part of a confidentiality agreement with the
judges, we do not reveal their names or gender, but instead refer to them by a letter ðor combination
of lettersÞ and male pronouns.
5. For simplicity, app. A includes the full list of hypotheses discussed in the following sections
and the dependent variable used to test the different hypotheses.
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Do Haves Hire Better Attorneys?
When asked directly, almost none of the judges indicated that they were familiar with any
of the social science literature on party capability theory described above. But when asked
whowon and why, they often gave answers based on their experience that echoedmany of
the themes in the social science literature on party capability theory.
The judges we interviewed appeared to think that hiring the best attorneys was a key
to the success of government and other repeat players. Judge B maintained that while not
all government lawyers were wonderful, the average was high. He said, “we are over-
populated with lawyers and they vary a lot in ability, but the government almost always
has a good lawyer, and so on average the quality of the government attorney is better than
the opposition.” But he suggested that if you looked at cases involving the government
versus major corporations, “I bet you would find a different result.” Judge T elaborated
the same theme noting that the average quality of government lawyers is high compared
to the average of private parties. But he quickly added, “this is not to say that government
lawyers are better than those in the elite law firms—but it is true as a generalization
compared to all of the other lawyers we see.” Other judges gave a slightly more nuanced
view, noting that government lawyers were not always better than their opponents, but
that on average they were better. For instance, Judge T said that “government lawyers,
their average is better than their adversary. Some are very good, very few are bad or below
par.” On the other hand, one judge suggested that government lawyers compared favor-
ably even to lawyers from elite law firms. Judge N asserted that “the fact is that the quality
of the government lawyers is simply better” in many cases. “Even ‘tall building’ law firms
often have their hands full when up against career Justice lawyers.”
In the sample we examined, discussed in the analysis below, we find evidence
supporting a more nuanced view, though always in the manner suggested by the judges.
For example, the federal government tends to have more attorneys ðsuch as assistant
US attorneys ½AUSAsÞ with prior federal appellate litigation experience, those attorneys
representing large corporations at oral arguments ðUSmean experience is 56.6 cases, with
a median of 19, compared to a mean of 10.6 and median of 5 for attorneys representing
multinational and/or international corporationsÞ. However, supporting Judge T’s con-
tention that US counsel is not always superior to corporate legal representation, more than
10% of the orally arguing attorneys representing large corporations are more experienced
than the median federal oral litigator. Similarly, well over 10% of the federal orally arguing
attorneys have less experience than the median corporate orally arguing counsel.
Interestingly, the US advantage does not extend to other aspects of appellate legal
representation. For instance, 30.4% of orally arguing attorneys representing large corpora-
tions attended elite law schools, compared to 24.3% of orally arguing federal attorneys.
In summary, several authors of party capability theory ðe.g., Galanter 1974; Sheehan
et al. 1992Þ, and especially the judges interviewed, emphasized that repeat players
ðespecially the government and corporations that hire attorneys from the elite law firmsÞ
are represented by the best attorneys. Thus, they both assume that one of the advantages
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enjoyed by the repeat players is that they employ better attorneys. But to date, no one has
actually tested whether this is true. On the basis of the literature and judge interviews, we
hypothesize that, on average, attorneys hired by repeat players will have higher levels of
expertise than attorneys hired by nonrepeat players.
Empirics: Attorney Expertise as a Function of Party Capability
To test whether more capable litigants employ more capable legal representation, we use
data from the 1997–2002 update to the US Court of Appeals Database ðKuersten and
Haire 2002Þ.6 We used the smaller data set because it made it possible to collect in-
formation on the attorneys’ names and backgrounds ða time-consuming data collection
endeavorÞ. Indeed, as noted above, most studies rely solely on the litigant typologies to
measure party capability for this very reason ðsee Sheehan et al. 1992; Songer et al. 1999Þ.7
For each case, there are two observations: one for the appellant and one for the appellee.
Table B1 in appendix B provides an overview of the descriptive statistics.
The dependent variable is an index of lawyer capability created from three separate
indicators of litigation team experience and quality. Separate measures are created for the
capability of the lawyers for the appellant and the appellee.
Prior litigation experience of the orally arguing attorney is the first of three different
measures of legal team capability. It is a variable that has been employed in a variety of
studies examining several different courts, including the US Supreme Court ðe.g., Mc-
Guire 1995, 1998; Johnson, Wahlbeck, and Spriggs 2006; McAtee and McGuire 2007;
Corley 2008; Szmer and Ginn 2014Þ, the Supreme Court of Canada ðSzmer, Johnson,
and Sarver 2007; Kaheny, Szmer, and Sarver 2011Þ, and the US courts of appeals ðHaire,
Lindquist, andHartley 1999; Szmer et al. 2013Þ. Theoretically, prior experience helps the
attorneys develop process expertise, which should enhance the ability of the advocate to
construct and present more persuasive arguments ðSzmer 2005Þ.
To generate the experience variable, we first identified the names of the orally arguing
attorneys for each side. To derive this, we started with the Federal Court Cases: Integrated
Data Base on Appellate Terminations, produced by the Federal Judicial Center, to iden-
tify whether the case was orally argued. Among those cases that were argued, we then tried
to identify the orally arguing attorney, usually identifiable from the published decision in
LexisNexis. In the remaining cases, we used the US Administrative Office of the Court’s
Public Access to Court Electronic Records database to identify the name of the attorney
that presented the oral argument ðin approximately 40 cases we could not identify the
6. The data are available at the JuRi website at the University of South Carolina: http://www
.artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri.
7. We also note that other studies, like Songer and Sheehan ð1992Þ, that rely on more time-
consuming data collection ðin that study they examined unpublished and published casesÞ use smaller
time periods. Also, some more recent studies ðe.g., Collins and Moyer 2008Þ have relied solely on
the update. Similarly, several studies of US Supreme Court litigators analyzed 6-year time frames—
with fewer cases per year ðe.g., McGuire 1995, 1998; McAtee and McGuire 2007Þ.
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name of the orally arguing attorneysÞ. We then searched the LexisNexis US Courts of
Appeals database for cases with the names of the attorney in the “counsel” field of the
US courts of appeals with a date restraint limiting the search to cases decided prior to the
decision date of the case at hand. Since there is reason to believe that there are diminish-
ing marginal gains to increasing levels of experience ðe.g., see Johnson et al. 2006Þ, the
actual attorney experience variable reflects the natural log of the total number of prior
US courts of appeals cases in which the particular attorney was listed as a counsel for one
of the litigants.8
Beyond prior litigation experience, recent studies have also used the reputation of the
orally arguing attorney’s law school alma mater as a proxy measure of capability ðe.g.,
Johnson et al. 2006; Sarver, Kaheny, and Szmer 2008; Szmer, Sarver, and Kaheny 2010;
Szmer and Ginn 2014Þ. Presumably, law school prestige, due in part to the selectivity of
the admissions process, at least roughly reflects the part of expertise that is a function of
intelligence and drive. Our measure of law school prestige, gathered primarily from the
Martindale-Hubbell Lawyer Index and supplemented by law firm websites, is a dichot-
omous variable, classifying schools as either elite or nonelite. We borrowed our operation-
alization from Slotnick ð1983Þ, who identified 15 prestigious schools through a com-
posite measure of a variety of different law school rankings.9
Our third measure of the quality of legal representation is the number of attorneys
employed by the litigant, a measure utilized in a few recent studies ðe.g., Szmer et al. 2007,
2010, 2013; Haire and Moyer 2008Þ. Presumably, larger litigation teams have several
advantages over smaller teams, including enhanced abilities to anticipate and respond to
counterarguments ða particularly important component of appellate advocacyÞ, increased
research power, and the ability to conduct preparatory moot court sessions. Because of the
possible diminishing marginal gains from larger litigation teams, our measure is the
natural log of the number of lawyers representing the side according to the published
decision.10
Of course, all three measures of the quality of legal representation used to create the
dependent variable are proxies, which only roughly reflect the underlying, latent concept.
As such, it is appropriate to combine all three measures into an index, which should
reduce the measurement error. To do so, we generated factor scores from principal
8. Since the natural log of zero is undefined, we include the actual case in the count of the number
of oral arguments so that the minimum value is one and thus the log is defined. This is the functional
equivalent of adding a constant of one—a typical response when the raw variable includes zero values.
Additionally, we did estimate alternative models using the untransformed value of the attorney
experience variable. The results of the hypotheses tests using these ancillary analyses were virtually
identical to the results from the models we chose to present in the text.
9. Slotnick’s ð1983Þ prestigious schools are Harvard, Yale, Chicago, Stanford, Columbia, Michigan,
Berkeley, Pennsylvania, New York University, Duke, Virginia, Texas, Cornell, Northwestern, and UCLA.
For an extensive discussion of the measurement validity of the concept, see Szmer and Ginn ð2014,
n. 14Þ.
10. We also performed a variety of ancillary analyses using the untransformed litigation team size
variable. The results of the hypotheses tests did not change.
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components factor analyses of all three indicators.11 Higher values of the index indicate
higher levels of litigation team expertise.
Since the dependent variable is continuous, we estimated the coefficients using or-
dinary least squares ðOLSÞ regression. We regressed the attorney expertise index on party
capability, as well as a variety of case-level factors. The unit of analysis is the party in the
case, so there are two observations per case. Given the structure of the data, we clustered
the standard errors by case.
The main independent variable, party capability, was constructed using the typical
hierarchy used in many prior studies ðe.g., Sheehan et al. 1992; Songer and Sheehan
1992; Songer et al. 1999Þ. The proxy measure is based on the assumption that certain
classes of litigants ðe.g., governments, businessesÞ have more resources and experience
than other classes ðe.g., personÞ because of differences in organizational characteristics.
Using this method, we assigned litigants the following values: 15 individual person, 25
associations, 3 5 small business, 4 5 local government, 5 5 big business,12 6 5 state
government, and 75 US government.13 We included two variables: the capability of the
11. Since we derived the scales from a factor analysis, we examined the resulting eigenvalues to
measure the reliability of our index ðsee Carmines and Zeller 1979Þ. A single eigenvalue greater than
one provides evidence that the components of the index reliably reflect a single underlying dimension
ðsee Kim and Mueller 1978; also see Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman ½2005, Johnson, Spriggs, and
Wahlbeck ½2005, and Collins ½2008 for applications of this rule to judicial behavior studiesÞ. Specifi-
cally, the eigenvalue for the first factor was 1.3, while the second-highest eigenvalue was approximately
0.89. Moreover, the correlations of the components with the index were all between .60 and .71. We also
estimated the model using different versions of each separate component as the dependent variable ðe.g.,
untransformed and logged versions of experience, untransformed and logged versions of team size, and a
logistic regression model of law school qualityÞ. The results of the primary hypothesis test are robust across
all supplemental models.
12. Businesses were coded as big business ð5Þ if they were clearly a national or multinational
corporation. Otherwise, they were coded as a small business ð3Þ. We also estimated models combining
big and small businesses into one category. The results of the hypotheses tests are consistent with those
presented in our article.
13. Of course, one could argue that the construct is nominal, while we implicitly treat it as
interval. While it is the general consensus that the US government and individual persons are the
highest and lowest categories, respectively, the order of the middle categories is less certain. Even if the
order is correct, the distances between the adjacent categories are likely not equal. We generally rely on
theory as well as the cited prior studies to justify the order and the decision to treat the seven-category
variable as interval. Moreover, this is more parsimonious, given that the alternative is to replace two
variables with 12 binary variables. However, as a robustness check, we estimated models with alternative
specifications of party capability. In some versions we changed the order or collapsed adjacent categories.
In other models, we replaced the party capability typologies with dummy variables for each category except
the excluded reference category. The results of some of these models are presented in app. C. When we
change the order of the middle categories or collapsed categories, the results do not change.When we include
dummy variables, the results are generally consistent with those presented in the text, though in some
instances the estimated effect of the dummy variable for a small number of categories is not statistically
significant at the .05 or .1 level when the coefficient for the corresponding typology presented in the text
was significant. Typically, that occurred when there were fewer observations with litigants in that category.
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party that employed the attorney ðparty capabilityÞ and the capability of the opposing
party. The former reflects the main independent variable, while the latter is included in
this model as a control ðpresumably the perceived quality of the opponent influences
the decision to hire one’s own counselÞ. We expect that both variables will be positively
correlated with the dependent variable.
We also included a variety of case-level covariates. Three of them reflect salience and/
or complexity: the total number of amicus briefs filed in support of either side, prior
publication by the district court in the Federal Supplement, and points of law, operation-
alized as the number of headnotes in the West Federal Reporter version of the decision.14
The results of a principal components factor analysis of the three indicators suggested
that amicus support and prior publication reflected a single dimension, while the points
of law measure appeared to tap into a separate dimension.15 We think the first dimension
reflects salience, while the points of law measure is a proxy for legal complexity.
Additionally, we included two issue area dummy variables: economics and criminal.16
The reference category includes civil rights and civil liberties cases and those that are not
easily categorized. We expect that the economics variable will be positive, as the financial
aspects of these cases tend to attract quality counsel. Conversely, intermediate criminal
appeals tend to be fairly pro forma, such that they attract private counsel with lower levels
of capability.
The model estimates, presented in table 1, support our hypothesis. The party capa-
bility variable was statistically significant and positive. In other words, litigants with more
resources appear to hire more capable counsel, even after controlling for opponent’s party
capability, case salience, points of law, and issue area. These results support one of the
never before tested assumptions made by Galanter: one of the advantages of the repeat
player haves is that they are able to hire more experienced and capable counsel than their
have-not opponents. All the controls were statistically significant and positive, as
14. Each headnote reflects, in the opinion of the West editorial staff, a single legal issue addressed
in the decision. For more information, see http://lawschool.westlaw.com/knumbers/default.asp?
mainpage516&subpage54.
15. Specifically, one factor had an eigenvalue of 1.14 while a second factor had an eigenvalue
of 0.99. The amicus curiae participation and prior publication were highly correlated with the first
factor ðcorrelations above .7Þ, while the correlations of those two variables with the second factor
are both below .26. Conversely, the correlation between points of law and the second factor was
extremely high ð.94Þ, while it was weakly correlated with the first factor ðjust under .34Þ.
16. Torts cases, a subset of economic issues, could be idiosyncratic because the insurance companies
are often the real party representing the defendant—and, in some instances, the plaintiff as well. More-
over, the typical contingency fee model for hiring the plaintiff counsel is atypical compared to most
issue areas. As such, we estimated the model without tort cases. The results of the hypotheses tests are
identical to those in the model that we present in the text. We do suggest, however, that future research
should examine this question in greater detail.
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expected. Because we find evidence that the haves hire more capable attorneys, we next
examine whether the quality of the legal representation means more legal success.
Are Better Lawyers Associated with Better Outcomes?
Assuming that repeat players are, on average, more likely to hire expert counsel, does this
advantage translate into litigation success? Most of the party capability literature assumes
it does, but there is little hard evidence of the effect of quality attorneys. Presumably, like
repeat players, litigators with more experience are more credible ðMcGuire 1995Þ. Addi-
tionally, they may construct more persuasive arguments ðHaire et al. 1999; Szmer et al.
2007Þ. Studies of the US Supreme Court have shown that expert counsel are more likely
to present better oral arguments ðJohnson et al. 2006Þ and have language contained in
their briefs borrowed by the author of opinion of the court ðCorley 2008Þ.
While the prior empirical evidence offers limited support for the notion that attor-
neys influence the decisions of appeals court judges, these studies were all limited in
scope. Haire et al. ð1999Þ examined only product liability cases, while Szmer et al. ð2013Þ
looked at cases in which women attorneys faced a male opponent. Haire and Moyer’s
ð2008Þ analysis utilized bivariate statistics to examine the success of appellants as a
function of litigation team size, but they did not examine appellee team size.
Table 1. OLS Model of Attorney Expertise as a Function of Party
Capability, US Courts of Appeals, 1997–2002
Independent Variable Coefficient
Party capability .16***
ð.01Þ
Opponent party capability .05***
ð.01Þ
Salience .13***
ð.02Þ
Points of law .01***
ð.00Þ
Issue areas:
Economics .19***
ð.04Þ
Criminal 2.09*
ð.04Þ
Constant 2.89
Observations 3,994
Adjusted R2 .14
Note.—Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05 ðone-tailed testÞ.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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Moreover, virtually all of the judges interviewed agreed that good lawyers are a key
reason for litigant success. When we probed for the judges’ views as to why the national
government won so frequently, the answers sounded very much like a seminar on party
capability theory. First, judge after judge suggested that a key to government success was
that their lawyers, on average, were simply better than most of the lawyers appearing in
their court. We heard many variations of this same basic theme throughout our inter-
views. JudgeWW said it directly: “Part of the reason for the government’s high win rate is
the skill level—the government’s lawyers are simply better.” Or as Judge GG put it, “The
US government tends to win more often partly due to attorney skill. The attorneys at the
federal level are top notch.” Judge C agreed. “I guess I would say that often the quality
of the advocacy seems higher from government attorneys—the government often has
attorneys who are experts in a particular area of litigation.” As a result, according to
Judge G, US attorneys almost always present you with a well-constructed case. Judge D
was even more effusive in his praise for government lawyers, saying, “government
attorneys tend to be of extremely good quality; in general government briefs are especially
good—and effective advocacy definitely makes a difference on outcomes. The quality of
the government argument often gives them a tremendous advantage over their oppo-
nents.” Judge SS summed up: “The government lawyers—AUSAs—that argue cases
before our court are usually quite good. I imagine part of this has to do with preparation
and being comfortable in the courtroom even if it is an appellate courtroom. Also to be an
AUSA you have to have your wits about you and need to be highly competent, so naturally
this will carry over to how successful you are in court and case dispositions.”17
And finally, several judges suggested that, on average, the government lawyers were
more credible than many of their opponents, and as a result, they ðthe judgesÞ trusted
their presentations more than those of some of their opponents. Judge DD summed up
the view expressed by several judges when he said, “For me I appreciate the candidness of
the assistant US attorneys, and I mean often they will outright identify arguments that are
on both sides of the issue and you begin to feel more comfortable that they don’t have a
dog in it. I don’t mean they don’t care but they don’t have an agenda.”
Thus, while both the literature on party capability and the judges generally assume
that having good attorneys is one of the advantages of the repeat players, they are also
credited with a number of other advantages resulting from both their superior financial
resources and their experience as repeat players ðe.g., influencing the development of
procedural and substantive rules, the fiscal flexibility and savvy to be able to pursue
winnable litigation/appeals, and enhanced credibilityÞ. Nonetheless, the current state of
the literature leaves unresolved the extent to which there are advantages of repeat players
17. Importantly, Judge SS specifically points out the enhanced credibility of the AUSAs. The
attorneys in the US attorney’s offices typically are responsible for criminal appeals. Since criminal
prosecutors represent the people and are supposed to place justice concerns above their clients’
interests, we would expect they would have higher levels of perceived credibility.
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that exert an impact of outcomes that is independent of the effect of having better
attorneys. We seek to clarify the potential independent effects of attorney expertise and
other advantages of repeat players by simultaneously evaluating two related questions.
First we posit that US courts of appeals judges are more likely to side with parties that
have more resources and experience, when compared to parties with less resources and
experience.
Related to the question above, whether better lawyers are associated with better out-
comes, we ask whether judges are more likely to support “repeat players” after controlling
for the repeat player status of the litigants. If so, we suggest that US courts of appeals
judges are more likely to vote in favor of litigants represented by attorneys with higher
levels of expertise relative to opposing counsel even after controlling for the repeat player
status of the litigants.
Empirical Assessment of Party Capability and Attorney Capability
on Judicial Decision Making
Having provided evidence that both Galanter and the judges we interviewed were correct
in their expectation that repeat players would hire more capable attorneys, we next in-
vestigated whether relative party and attorney capability advantages actually mattered.
First, we regressed judges’ votes on litigation team expertise. We then ran a model that
included both the attorney measure and party capability typology, to test whether party
capability influence was due to more than just relative advantages in the quality of legal
representation—and vice versa. In the same model, we also examined whether the in-
fluence of party capability exists after controlling for ideology. Then we estimated the
same model in cases in which the United States was not a litigant to determine whether
the party capability advantage was limited to the government gorilla. Finally, we tested
whether the US advantage in this context was purely a function of attorney capability by
including dummy variables for US participation as a litigant with and without the lit-
igation team expertise measure.
In contrast to the first model, where the unit of analysis was the side ðappellant or
appelleeÞ in the case, the unit of analysis is now the judge’s vote in the case. In other
words, with three-judge panels, there are three observations for each case.18 Our depen-
dent variable is the vote for ð1Þ or against ð0Þ the appellant. Given that the variable is
dichotomous, we estimated the model using logistic regression. Since we have multiple
observations for each judge and circuit, we estimated standard errors clustered by judge
and included circuit-level fixed effects. Table B2 in appendix B provides an overview of
the descriptive statistics used for models 2–4.
Since we are interested in both the overall effects of attorney quality on judicial
decision making and the degree to which attorney quality mediates the effects of party
18. We excluded en banc decisions, which are idiosyncratic and make up a small part of the
docket.
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capability, we estimated two models ðboth presented in table 2Þ. First, we estimated the
model including litigation team expertise but not a measure of litigant status. This should
capture the overall effects of attorney quality. Next, we included both main independent
variables in the model of judge votes to determine whether party capability has an effect
on appellate decision making beyond the indirect effect associated with the ability to hire
better legal representation.
Litigation team expertise was computed using the index that we previously discussed.
However, to account for the nature of the adversarial system, the variable in table 2 is ac-
tually the difference between litigation team expertise for the appellant and the appellee.19
We expected a positive coefficient reflecting the increased likelihood of a vote for an
appellant when it is represented by a higher-quality litigation team than its foe.
Using conventions described earlier, we included party capability measures for the
appellant and appellee.20 Given our theory and the coding of the dependent variable, we
expected to find a positive coefficient for the appellant party capabilitymeasure, a negative
coefficient for the appellee’s capability, and a positive coefficient for the difference be-
tween the appellant and appellee.
In addition, we controlled for the effects of judicial policy preferences. There are at
least four different sets of preferences that could affect US courts of appeals judge decision
making. Most obviously, judges are likely to be influenced by their own ideologies. How-
ever, court of appeals judges work in three-judge panels, with a collegial environment
and norms of consensus ðHettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006; Bowie, Songer, and
19. Like the earlier measure, the expertise measures are factor scores. For each side, the factor
analysis was fairly reliable and there appeared to be one underlying dimension. The eigenvalue for the
single factor for the appellant measure was above 1.3, while the appellee measure eigenvalue was just
above 1.25. The second-highest eigenvalues were 0.86 and 0.93, respectively. In both instances, the
composite variables were moderately to highly correlated with the index ðbetween .53 and .72Þ. Also,
as in the earlier versions, we estimated the models using a variety of alternative measures; including the
components separately as opposed to in the index, using untransformed versions of experience and/or
litigation team size, and using separate measures for the appellant and appellee. The indices are always
significant regardless of how we measure the components. Interestingly, when we separate out the
components, in the versions of models presented in tables 2 and 3, litigation experience is not sig-
nificant but the other two measures are significant. Conversely, in the model presented in table 4, law
school prestige is not significant while the other two concepts are significant. Also, when we separate
appellant and appellee litigation expertise, only the appellant expertise measure in the second model
in table 4 is not statistically significant. In other words, the measures are fairly robust, though on the
whole our version appears to best reflect the underlying concepts and the theoretical relationship. This
is consistent with the basic philosophy behind generating an index to combine flawed individual proxy
measures: the resulting index minimizes the errors and better reflects the underlying latent concept.
20. As in the original model, we performed a variety of robustness checks varying the categories
slightly and, in some instances, using dummy variable coding. The results are generally consistent with
the models presented in the text. The models are available on request. Changing the values of the
categories in the typology never changed the hypotheses tests for the party capability measures. When
we used dummy variable coding, most, if not all, of the coefficients were significant or borderline
significant ð.05 < p < .1Þ in the expected direction.
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Szmer 2014Þ. It is possible that the median panel judge will then exert the most influence
over the panel decision and therefore the individual panelists’ votes. Similarly, the three
panelists are also members of a larger circuit, and their decision is subject to influence by
possible en banc review. Therefore, we might expect that the individual panelist will con-
sider the circuit median preferences when deciding cases ðMcNollgast 1995; VanWinkle
1997; Cross and Tiller 1998; Giles,Walker, and Zorn 2006Þ. Additionally, our interviews
confirmed previous studies that noted the importance of circuit law for the decision
Table 2. Likelihood of a Judge Vote in Favor of the Appellant as a Function of Attorney Capability
and Party Capability, 1997–2002
Independent Variable Coefficient
Discrete Change
ðPercentage
ChangeÞ Coefficient
Discrete Change
ðPercentage
ChangeÞ
Litigation team expertise .15*** .08 .07** .04
ð.03Þ ð28.37Þ ð.03Þ ð11.69Þ
Appellant capability .11*** .08
ð.02Þ ð21.08Þ
Appellee capability 2.11*** 2.11
ð.02Þ ð-24.28Þ
Judge ideological congruence .22* .04 .21* .04
ð.10Þ ð13.40Þ ð.09Þ ð12.54Þ
Panel ideological congruence .23* .04 .26** .05
ð.10Þ ð12.70Þ ð.10Þ ð14.35Þ
Circuit ideological congruence .08 2.04
ð.14Þ ð.14Þ
Supreme Court ideological
congruence 2.53*** .09 1.08* .04
ð.51Þ ð31.00Þ ð.54Þ ð11.76Þ
Salience .02 2.01
ð.03Þ ð-.03Þ
Points of law 2.00 2.00
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Economic .11 .12
ð.09Þ ð.09Þ
Criminal 2.08 .19a .04
ð.08Þ ð.10Þ ð13.23Þ
Constant 2.44 2.08
Observations 4,736 4,736
McKelvey and Zavoina R2 .10 .12
Note.—Discrete changes are differences in the predicted probability a judge sides with the appellant when X is set to
two values ðcontinuous variables: standard deviation ±mean; appellant/appellee capability: rounded standard deviation ±
medianÞ and the other covariates are held constant at the appropriate measure of central tendency. Percentage changes are
discrete changes divided by the predicted probability when X is set to the lower value, multiplied by 100. Robust clustered
standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05 ðone-tailed testÞ.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
a Two-tailed test: p < .05; the sign is in the unexpected direction.
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making of appeals court judges. Given this importance, any statistical congruence be-
tween the ideology of the circuit and the votes of individual judges might reflect the
influence of circuit law on the decision calculus of individual judges ðreflecting the as-
sumption that over time the general tenor of circuit law will reflect the ideological pref-
erences of the judges on the circuitÞ. Finally, because of the prospect of review by the
Supreme Court, some have suggested that the judges are also influenced by the prefer-
ences of the high court for fear of reversal ðSonger, Segal, and Cameron 1994;McNollgast
1995; but see Bowie and Songer ½2009, which challenges this assertion for three reasons,
including the statements of an overwhelming majority of the judges the authors
interviewedÞ.21
We measure the judge’s ideology using a variant of the Giles, Hettinger, and Pepper
ð2001; GHPÞ scores, which are generated using Poole and Rosenthal’s ð1997Þ Common
Space Nominate scores for the parties involved in the judicial selection process for ap-
peals court judges: the appointing president and the home state senators from the pres-
ident’s party. Like the GHP scores, when the home state senators for the vacancy are not
from the president’s party, the judges’ ideology is coded as the president’s Nominate score.
However, our measure differs when senatorial courtesy is in play. While the GHPmeasure
uses the average Nominate scores of the senators from the president’s party representing
the state of the vacancy, our measure uses the mean of the values for the senators and the
president ðthus accounting for the dual roles of the senators and the president in senatorial
courtesy regimesÞ. Higher positive scores indicate increasing conservatism while lower
negative scores indicate increasing liberalism. The actual variable, judge ideological con-
gruence, takes into account the preferences of the judge and the preferred outcome of
the litigants. The measure is equal to the judge ideology score if the appellant preferred
a conservative outcome; it is negative one times the judge ideology score if the appellant
preferred a liberal outcome. Similarly, the panel and circuit ideological congruence vari-
ables are also constructed using the preferences of the appellant and the judge ideology
scores of the median panelists and active circuit judge, respectively. We also operational-
ized the Supreme Court ideological congruence variable using the appellant’s preferred
outcome and the median justice’s ideology using the same logic; only the high court
justices’ ideologies were measured using the Judicial Common Space scores.22
The first model in table 2 tests our expectation that appellate judges are more likely to
side with litigants represented by more capable litigation teams. The results provide
strong supporting evidence. As expected, the coefficient for the litigation team size
21. Alternatively, since it is well established that the ideological preferences of the Supreme Court
majority have a major impact on the precedents they create, congruence between the ideological
preferences of the median justice on the Supreme Court and the decisions of appeals court judges may
have as much to do with the strong norm of following precedent on the courts of appeals than any
suggestion that the judges are responding strategically to the possibility of reversal.
22. These can be found at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/JCS.html.
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variable is positive and statistically significant at the .001 level. Moreover, the effects are
also substantively significant. The discrete changes presented in table 2 are the differences
in the predicted probability that the judge sided with the appellant when the independent
variable is held to two different values ðone standard deviation above and below the ap-
propriate measure of central tendencyÞ while the other covariates are set to their appro-
priate measure of central tendency. The discrete change for litigation team expertise is .08.
In other words, the probability of a judge vote for the appellant is .08 greater when the
relative litigation team advantage of the appellant is one standard deviation above the
mean, compared towhen the relative advantage is one standard deviation below themean.
In relative terms, when the otherwise typical appellant has a litigation team expertise
advantage that is one standard deviation above the mean, the probability of a judge vote
for the appellant is 28.37% greater than when the similarly situated appellant has a
litigation team advantage that is one standard deviation below the mean.
Next, to determine the relative effects of party capability after accounting for advan-
tages stemming from the ability to employ higher-quality litigation teams, we added the
two party capability variables to the model.23 The results strongly support the prediction
that judges are more likely to side both with parties with more resources and with parties
represented by counsel with more experience relative to their opponents. As expected, the
coefficients for the party capability variables are both significant, and the signs are in the
predicted directions; as appellant capability increases, the judge is more likely to vote in
favor of the appellant; as the appellee capability increases, the judge is less likely to side
with the appellant. The significant and positive litigation team expertise coefficient evi-
dences the tendency of judges to side with appellants with more capable litigation teams
compared to their opponents.
Furthermore, all three constructs appear to have substantively significant effects on the
judges. For the appellant capability measure, we compared the predicted probability of a
vote for the appellant when the appellant was a local government, compared to when the
appellant was an individual person. On average, the probability of a vote for a state/local
government appellant is more than 21% higher than the vote for an individual person
appellant ðthe “percentage change” noted in table 2Þ.
For appellees, the median category was a 5 ðbig businessÞ with a standard deviation
that rounds to 2. As such, we calculated the discrete change when the appellee was the
US government compared to a small business appellee. The probability of a pro-appellant
vote in the average case drops by almost 25% ðfrom .45 to .34Þ when the appellant
23. Of course, given the findings in the first analysis, one might be rightly concerned about
high multicollinearity between the party capability and litigation team expertise variables. However,
this is not a problem. None of the variance inflation factors ðVIFsÞ for this model or any of the
subsequent models were high enough to register concern. In fact, other than the VIFs for the circuit
fixed effects, only the VIF for criminal case was above two ðand even then it was never greater
than 2.12Þ.
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has to face the United States—compared to a typically situated appellant facing a
small business.24
Finally, when the litigation team expertise variable, reflecting the relative quality of the
appellant’s legal team compared to its opponent, is one standard deviation above the
mean, the typically situated appellant is almost 12% more likely to win compared to
when the expertise variable is a standard deviation below the mean. In summary, both
the quality of the litigation teams on each side and the other differences in party capability
ðe.g., representing differences in other litigation resources and repeat player statusÞ inde-
pendently increase the chances for litigation success. Next we address possible alternative
causal mechanisms underlying the observed success of the haves in appellate ligation.
INVESTIGATING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
OF PARTY CAPABILITY
Scholars have posited additional explanations for the tendency of judges to side with
more capable litigants. Perhaps some of the observed advantages stem from the success of
government litigants? Or maybe the haves win more because judge ideologies tend to
align with the goals of litigants with more resources? Or do more capable parties win
because they pursue more winnable cases? We discuss and explore each of these alter-
natives in the subsequent sections.
The Government Gorilla
When asked who tended to win most frequently in their courts, all but three of the judges
indicated that they believed that the federal government won more frequently than other
categories of litigants. Kritzer ð2003Þ contends that this success of the national govern-
ment is largely the by-product of the control over the institutional rules that govern liti-
gation. Moreover, Kritzer posits that governments often have the power to create, orga-
nize, and staff the court systems within their jurisdiction, which leads to regime loyalty.
Kritzer goes further, contending that the national government is the truly dominant
litigant, in large part because of this ability to choose the rules that govern the court, as
well as the judges that staff it.
A few of the judges echoed the scholarly argument reflected in Kritzer’s ð2003, 349–
50Þ contention that “it is almost too obvious to say that government makes rules for its
own advantage, but it is probably a central aspect of government’s advantage.” Judge F
expressed this view most clearly, arguing that “Congress wrote the laws to favor the
24. While the overall impacts of the party capability variables are both substantively significant, we
caution against interpreting the larger effects for the appellee variable as evidence that appellee capability
is more influential. We used a neutral rule for choosing categories to determine discrete changes. However,
when we use the same categories to estimate the discrete changes for each variable, the effect sizes for the
appellant variable are slightly larger.
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national government—both burdens of proof and standards of review often favor the
government.”
Other judges picked up on this theme, also echoed by Kritzer ð2003, 358–61Þ, that
supposedly neutral norms regarding deference often favor the government in litigation.
For instance, Judge E agreed, maintaining that in administrative law, especially afterChev-
ron, “we are sometimes directed as a matter of law to give deference to the administrative
decision. And in criminal law you are generally not inclined to overturn the jury’s decision
unless there was a serious error.”
Additionally, the national government sometimes wins because of its institutional
position. As JudgeD noted, “government attorneys are able to speak for the public interest
with legitimacy in a way that is usually not possible for other litigants. A government
lawyer’s appeal can be a plea to serve the public interest that may give them an edge with
judges; and these appeals to the public interest are bolstered by the fact that all judges are
aware of the way that the government screens cases and will not bring cases if it believes
there is not a strong argument.”
There are several additional explanations for government hegemony. A large body of
work has focused on the success of the US government in Supreme Court litiga-
tion ðCaplan 1987; Segal 1988, 1990; Salokar 1992; Black and Owens 2012Þ. Most
studies conclude that the solicitor general’s tremendous success is a function of the
enhanced credibility of the office ðe.g., Caplan 1987; Salokar 1992Þ. Others, like
McGuire ð1998Þ, contend that the source of the solicitor general’s advantage lies in the
experience and expertise of the attorneys, though Black and Owens ð2012Þ find that
the advantage goes well beyond attorney experience.
We estimated three models to test aspects of the government gorilla hypothesis. The
model in table 3 replicates the analyses from table 2 using all cases in our sample in which
the United States did not participate as a party. This allows us to examine the degree to
which the party capability advantage extends to other types of litigants.
The results suggest that party capability plays a role in cases without the United States
but is weaker when the United States is not a party. The coefficient for appellee capabil-
ity is significant in the hypothesized direction ðnegativeÞ, and litigation team expertise is
significant and positive, as anticipated. Both of these findings suggest that party resources
matter even when the United States is not a party. On the other hand, the negative co-
efficient for the appellant capability variable is neither significant nor in the posited di-
rection. However, with respect to substantive effects, the appellee capability variable ef-
fects are still robust: a discrete change of 20.09 and a percentage change of just under
15%. Moreover, the effects of litigation team expertise appear stronger in this model.
This mixed bag suggests some support for Kritzer’s government gorilla theory. When
we exclude cases in which the United States is a litigant from the model, the effects of
party capability are less significant—both statistically and substantively. But it is also clear
that non-US party capability still matters—but to a lesser degree.
Our results in table 3 also clearly show that lawyer expertise matters even for non-
governmental litigants. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant, and if
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anything, the effect sizes are slightly stronger in the sample without the United States
ðdiscrete change of 0.08 vs. 0.04; percentage changes of 14.99 and 11.69, respectivelyÞ.
The analyses in table 4 uses the entire sample but replace the appellant and appellee
capability typology variables with two dummy variables: the US appellant and US ap-
pellee.25 The excluded category is when the United States is not a party to the cases. This
allows us to test the likelihood of the appellant winning when the United States is the
25. Alternatively, we could have included dummy variables for the other party categories. This
would allow us to account for the effects of the capability of the other litigants. For the sake of
parsimony, we do not include them in the model. However, when we do, the results ðpresented in
app. CÞ are consistent with those presented in table 4. Specifically, as in the results in table 4, when the
United States initiates the appeal, its presence is more influential than when the United States is an
appellee, and the finding is consistent regardless of whether we include litigation team expertise.
Table 3. Likelihood of a US Circuit Judge Vote in Favor of the Appellant as a
Function of Attorney Capability and Party Capability, in Cases in Which the
United States Is Not a Litigant, US Courts of Appeals, 1997–2002
Coefficient
Discrete
Change
Percentage
Change
Litigation team expertise .14*** .08 14.99
ð.04Þ
Appellant capability 2.01
ð.04Þ
Appellee capability 2.09** 2.09 214.93
ð.04Þ
Judge ideological congruence .16
ð.14Þ
Panel ideological congruence .49*** .09 17.92
ð.15Þ
Circuit ideological congruence .26
ð.20Þ
Supreme Court ideological congruence 2.10
ð.76Þ
Salience .15*** .08 14.82
ð.04Þ
Points of law .01* .04 7.28
ð.01Þ
Economic .06
ð.10Þ
Criminal 2.25 2.06 29.50
ð.17Þ
Constant .731
Observations 2,295
McKelvey and Zavoina R2 .12
Note.—Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05 ðone-tailed testÞ.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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appellant compared to situations in which some other litigant is appealing against the
United States or when the United States is not a party to the case.
The results generally support the hypothesis that courts of appeals judges are more
likely to side with the United States when it is the appellant, compared to cases in which
either the government is the appellee or the government is not a party. This reinforces the
view of the judges and the speculations of earlier studies that part of the advantage of the
US government is its selectivity in deciding which cases to appeal. While the US appellant
and appellee dummy variables are both highly statistically significant, we observed dra-
matic differences in the effect size estimates ðdiscrete and percentage changesÞ. On av-
erage, a circuit court judge is over 90% more likely to side with the United States as an
appellant compared to a non-US appellant in a typical case. This is more than four times
Table 4. US Influence on US Circuit Court Judges’ Votes for the Appellant, 1997–2002
No Litigation
Team Expertise Index
Litigation Team
Expertise Index
Coefficient
Discrete Change
ðPercentage ChangeÞ Coefficient
Discrete Change
ðPercentage ChangeÞ
US appellant 1.63*** .37 1.58*** .36
ð.14Þ ð92.90Þ ð.14Þ ð91.75Þ
US appellee 2.35*** 2.08 2.31*** 2.07
ð.09Þ ð219.82Þ ð.09Þ ð217.77Þ
Litigation team expertise . . . . . . .06** .04
ð.03Þ ð10.02Þ
Judge ideological congruence .22* .05 .22* .05
ð.10Þ ð12.29Þ ð.10Þ ð12.46Þ
Panel ideological congruence .26** .05 .26** .05
ð.10Þ ð13.36Þ ð.10Þ ð13.41Þ
Circuit ideological congruence .03 . . . .02 . . .
ð.14Þ ð.14Þ
Supreme Court ideological
congruence 1.90*** .07 1.87*** .07
ð.52Þ ð20.33Þ ð.52Þ ð20.01Þ
Salience .00 .00
ð.03Þ ð.03Þ
Points of law 2.00 2.00
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Economic 2.13 .12
ð.08Þ ð.08Þ
Criminal .01 2.01
ð.09Þ ð.09Þ
Constant 2.341 2.35
Observations 4,736 4,736
McKelvey and Zavoina R 2 .14 .14
Note.—Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05 ðone-tailed testÞ.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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higher inmagnitude than the discrete changes for the US appellee variables, even with the
significant controls ðjudge, panel, and Supreme Court ideological congruenceÞ.
By controlling for litigant expertise, table 4 also allows us to determine whether Mc-
Guire’s ð1998Þ findings in the Supreme Court context ðwhich suggests that any observed
advantages held by the United States as a litigant disappear after controlling for lawyer
expertiseÞ are also present in the courts of appeals. The results suggest thatMcGuire’s thesis
may be relevant only for the Supreme Court. The US government dummy variables are
both statistically significant in the expected directions ðwhen the United States is the
appellant, the judge is more likely to decide for the appellant compared to cases in which
the United States is not a party; conversely, when the United States is the appellee, the
judge is less likely to vote against the appellant compared to instances in which the United
States is not involved in the appealÞwhether or not we include the litigation team expertise
measure. Similarly, the discrete changes are barely affected by the inclusion of the lawyer
capabilitymeasure in the secondmodel. That is, even though the superior attorneys of the
United States appear to contribute to the government’s success, the strong advantage
enjoyed by the United States remains even when one controls for attorney capability and
expertise.
This could be a function of the additional aspects of the government advantage we
previously discussed, including tendencies to defer to the government and the role that
government has in fashioning procedural and substantive rules that govern the litigation
process. Or it could be that McGuire’s ð1998Þ findings in his US Supreme Court study
may not be transferable to the US courts of appeals because of institutional differences in
the process by which the government participates in litigation at these two levels. Un-
fortunately, while it appears that the US advantage does extend beyond its control of
which cases to appeal and the expertise of its attorneys, we do not have the data needed
to test some of the other suggested bases of government success.
Does Ideology Explain Litigant Success?
Sheehan et al. ð1992Þ contend that most of the observed advantages of repeat players, at
least at the US Supreme Court level, are a function of ideological attachments to certain
types of litigants ðor at least the policies that these litigants tend to advocateÞ. For exam-
ple, conservatives are pro–state government and business, while liberals tend to support
individuals and the national government. Indeed, after they controlled for ideology, much
of the observed party capability effect disappeared. While they suggest that this is an
artifact of the attitudinal nature of Supreme Court decision making, which is encouraged
by the institutional structure of the high court, studies suggest that the US intermediate
appellate court judges are also partially ideological actors ðGoldman 1975; Songer et al.
2000; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2004Þ.26 For example, while the Supreme
Court is not subject to review by a higher court, the courts of appeals, while technically
26. Though judge ideology appears to exert a larger impact on the decisions of Supreme Court
justices than it does on the decisions of judges on the courts of appeals ðZorn and Bowie 2010Þ.
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subject to review, are practically courts of last resort because of the reduced Supreme
Court caseload and the burgeoning court of appeals dockets ðHoward 1981; Songer et al.
2000; Klein 2002; Bowie et al. 2014Þ.
Interestingly, while several of the judges admitted that in a few cases, their decisions
were influenced by what social scientists might label their political values ðthe judges
themselves usually used different terms, like “sense of justice in the case”Þ, no judge took
the position that the observable advantages of repeat players stem from ideological ad-
herence to policies that tend to favor certain types of groups. Consequently, our next hy-
pothesis tests the difference in perspective between the judges and empirical social sci-
entists as to whether the advantages of repeat players are eliminated when one controls for
judicial ideology. We posit that US courts of appeals judges are more likely to vote in favor
of more capable litigants than less capable litigants—even after controlling for the effects
of ideology.
We use the models presented in tables 2–4 to assess this alternative explanation for
party capability success. We find evidence that the effects of party status and attorney
capability are strong in spite of the controls for ideology. Consistent with previous work
on the effects of ideology in appellate courts, in tables 2 and 3, almost all the relevant
ideology variables are statistically significant. Only circuit-level ideological congruence
appears to have no effect on judge support for the appellant once controls for party
capability variables are included in the model. In the model examining cases in which
the United States is a party, only panel and circuit ideology are significant at the .1 level.
Also, interestingly, all the ideology discrete changes are lower than the effects of the
party and attorney capability variables and similar in magnitude to the effects of lawyer
expertise. Thus, these results reaffirm previous findings of the significance of the ideolog-
ical preferences of appeals court judges on their voting choices while simultaneously
demonstrating that in contrast to the findings on the Supreme Court noted above, there
are strong party capability effects on the courts of appeals even after one controls for the
effects of ideology.
SELECTION EFFECTS: PARTY CAPABILITY
AND APPEALING WINNABLE CASES
As Kritzer ð2003Þ and several judges suggest, repeat players are more likely to win at least
in part because they are more likely to pursue appeals only when they believe they have a
high probability of success. Presumably, many of the posited advantages of party capa-
bility indirectly augment the ability of the haves to more accurately assess the likelihood
of success, including an enhanced understanding of the litigation process resulting
from prior litigation experience, the presence of in-house counsel, and the financial
resources to employ expert outside legal counsel. Litigants with more resources are also
better positioned to absorb losses ðGalanter 1974Þ. For example, a large corporation can
absorb a $10 million verdict against the company when it predicts a likely defeat on
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appeal. This strategy is particularly enticing to the repeat player with resources, because it
may be deterred from pursuing appeals likely to result in precedents that are, in the long
term, against the repeat player’s interest ðGalanter 1974Þ. Note that while the general
“selection effect” theory applies broadly to all types of haves, the judges’ discussions all
focused on the advantages that stem from the ability of one litigant to appeal winnable
cases: the United States.
Although the judges rarely used the word “strategic” in their remarks, they clearly
understood that the US government often gained advantages by its ability to strategically
decide when and where to appeal and when to accept losses in the trial courts. Judge D
perhaps summed up this commonperspective of the judgesmost directly.He said, “in civil
cases the government selects the cases carefully.27 It manages its docket, choosing which
cases to settle, which to drop after a loss at trial, and which to fight all the way. As a result, it
only takes to the court of appeals the cases that are favorable to the government.” Judge J
agreed, saying, “TheUS gets to pick and choose the cases it brings to us in ways that other
lawyers don’t; the US manages its docket much more consciously.”
This perception that the government wins in large part because it manages its docket
so well was repeated in slightly different ways by most of the judges. Judge K said that the
government’s success has “more to do with the way the government manages its docket.”
Judge N agreed, saying, “the Justice Department does a good job of screening which cases
are appealed.” Judge L noted that “the biggest reason the government wins so frequently is
their self-screening of cases to appeal; for example they will only appeal a social security
award when they think the award was outrageous; so as a general rule they just bring
better cases than most litigants.” Judge TTstated that “part of the reason I suppose is that
the government is doing their job and they usually don’t waste time on frivolous issues.”
And Judge G suggested that although the quality of government lawyers was typically
high, it was not the most important basis of the government’s success. Hemaintained that
“US attorneys almost always present you with a well-constructed case; but screening is
probably more important than the quality of argument because public defenders often do
a good job of arguing, as do some of the attorneys for private litigants.”
As previously discussed, the selection effect advantage stems from both resources and
experience. If there is an advantage from selecting more winnable cases, we would expect
to observe substantively greater advantages for higher-status appellants since they are the
side responsible for the decision to appeal. Conversely, in contrast to the Supreme Court
process, appellees can do very little ðbeyond settling, plea-bargaining, and dismissing
casesÞ to avoid appeals. As such, in our prior models, the coefficients for the appellant’s
party capability and the United States as an appellant should be statistically significant and
27. Conversely, criminal prosecutors have less discretion when appealing in part because their
appeals are typically limited to interlocutory issues ðthose decided during the process but prior to a
verdictÞ and because their duty is to the people as opposed to a client.
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exhibit more substantive significance than the coefficients for the corresponding appellee
variables.
Interestingly, we find little difference between appellant and appellee party capability
in the model including all types of litigants ðpresented in table 2Þ. If anything, contrary
to expectations, the appellee party capability variable has a higher estimate of substantive
significance.28 Moreover, when we exclude the United States from the model ðtable 3Þ,
the results clearly contradict the selection effect hypothesis. The coefficient for appellant
party capability is not statistically distinct from zero. In other words, there is no evidence
of any advantage stemming from increased status of the appellant among nonnational
litigants. Interestingly, the negative coefficient for the appellee party capability variable is
statistically significant in the hypothesized direction. In other words, contrary to our ex-
pectations, the appellant party capability advantage is not only substantively and signif-
icantly lower than the corresponding advantage for appellees; we find no evidence of
an advantage for nonnational appellants. We do, however, find an advantage for higher-
status appellees in this context. This suggests, at least among litigants other than the
United States, that there are some party capability advantages, but they have little, if
anything, to do with the tendency to select more winnable cases.
Nevertheless, we do find evidence supporting the judges’ contention that part of the
success of the US government is due to its selectivity in deciding which cases to appeal. In
the models presented in table 4, the substantive effect estimates for the United States as an
appellant are between four and a half and five times greater than the estimated effects of
the United States as an appellee. This is particularly striking given that the United States
is much more likely to face the weakest litigant class ðindividualsÞ when it is an appellee.
Specifically, when the United States is an appellee, in approximately 79% of the cases, the
opponent is an individual. Conversely, as an appellant the United States faces an
individual three-fifths of the time. Finally, even when cases involving individual litigants
are excluded ðmodel not reportedÞ, the effects of the United States as an appellant are
still much greater than the effects of the United States as an appellee.
CONCLUSION
At one level the analyses presented provide simply one more confirmation of the now
well-established theory of party capability. Our results show that in the most recent period
for which data are available, the “haves” tend to win consistently in the courts of appeals
when they face “have-nots,” just as they have in previous decades in these same courts and
as they have inmost other courts in the common law world. However, in contrast to prior
28. Even if we change the categories for the party capability measures when we estimate substan-
tive effects, we do not observe a greater advantage for the appellant. For example, when we compare the
United States to individuals for both variables, the estimated change in predicted probability for the
appellant party capability is 0.157, while the corresponding estimate is 0.167 for the appellee typology
variable.
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studies examining party capability, we focus more precisely on several potential causal
mechanisms underlying the party capability theory. For example, the advantage of
the haves clearly stems in part from their tendency to hire better litigation teams com-
pared to less capable opponents. As in some prior studies, we find strong evidence that
parties represented by relatively higher-quality counsel are more successful. Moreover, in
contrast to prior studies, we find that parties withmore resources are generally more likely
to hire better counsel than litigants with lower levels of resources.
Perhaps while unfamiliar with the social science literature on party capability, the judges
we interviewed overall seem to support and agree with the foundations of this theory. We
also find support for some of the hypotheses we developed on the basis of the judges’
interviews. For instance, several judges suggested that the US government’s advantages
stemmed in part from the ability to participate in winnable cases. Our analysis suggests
that judges tend to side with the United States more when it initiated the litigation ðas
either the appellant or the plaintiffÞ. The widespread views among appellate court judges
that the lawmatters and that the ability to effectively marshal arguments on the basis of the
law also matters receive strong support.
Furthermore, the results speak to previous theories about the special role of the na-
tional government. As Kritzer ð2003Þ posited, the United States is clearly the most dom-
inant litigant. In our model without the United States, the effects of party capability were
still present but weaker. Additionally, while the empirical and interview findings suggest
that the US advantage is in part due to the ability to select more winnable cases, we find
no evidence that this causal mechanism applies to nonnational high-status litigants.
We also found that two party capability findings from studies of the US Supreme
Court were not transferable to the US courts of appeals. Unlike McGuire’s ð1998Þ test of
party and attorney capability in SupremeCourt litigation, US success as a litigant is due to
more than just the quality of its representation before the courts of appeals. Also, in con-
trast to previous findings on the Supreme Court ðSheehan et al. 1992Þ, we find that on
the courts of appeals, repeat player status and attorney capability are important even after
controlling for the effects of ideology.
Overall, the study leverages rich qualitative data to lay out these often overlapping
hypotheses. Then we use the quantitative analyses to disentangle many of these causal
linkages to better understand party capability theory in general and in the US courts of
appeals. However, paradoxically, as we discuss in some detail, the typology measure of
party capability is obviously limited.We tend to assume the relative resources, experience,
and credibility of the categories without directly measuring them.We believe that studies
like ours that also include measures of the quality of the party’s legal representatives are
improvements ðe.g., see McGuire’s ½1995 Supreme Court studyÞ, and we believe this is
the first US court of appeals study to do so. However, while admittedly time-consuming,
we call on future studies of party capability theory to move beyond the typologies and the
measures of attorney capability to include direct measures of party experience and/or
resources.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1. Overview of Hypotheses and Their Associated Dependent Variables
Hypothesis and Category Dependent Variable
Table
Reference
Do “haves” have better attorneys?
Hypothesis 1: On average, attorneys hired by
repeat players will have higher levels of
expertise than attorneys hired by non–
repeat players.
Index of lawyer capability ðprior
litigation, reputation, and qualityÞ
Table 1
Are better attorneys associated with better
outcomes?
Hypothesis 2: US courts of appeals judges are
more likely to side with parties that have
more resources and experience, when
compared to parties with less resources and
experience.
Judge vote for or against appellant
ðfor 5 1, against 5 0Þ
Table 2
Hypothesis 3: US courts of appeals judges are
more likely to vote in favor of litigants
represented by attorneys with higher levels
of expertise relative to opposing counsel
even after controlling for the repeat player
status of the litigants.
Judge vote for or against appellant
ðfor 5 1, against 5 0Þ
Tables 2–4
Government gorilla:
Hypothesis 4: US courts of appeals judges will
side with litigants with more resources
rather than side with litigants with fewer
resources even in cases in which the US is
not a party.
Judge vote for or against appellant
ðfor 5 1, against 5 0Þ
Table 3
Hypothesis 5: US courts of appeals judges are
more likely to side with the United States
compared to other litigants, even after
controlling for attorney capability.
Judge vote for or against appellant
ðfor 5 1, against 5 0Þ
Table 4a
Ideology and litigant success:
Hypothesis 6: US courts of appeals judges are
more likely to vote in favor of more capable
litigants than less capable litigants, even
after controlling for the effects of ideology.
Judge vote for or against appellant
ðfor 5 1, against 5 0Þ
Tables 2–4b
Party capability and appealing winnable cases:
Hypothesis 7: The effects of party capability
are more substantively significant for the
appellant than the appellee.
Judge vote for or against appellant
ðfor 5 1, against 5 0Þ
Tables 2–4b
a The data to test hypothesis 5 include all cases in our sample in which the United States did not participate as a
party. See the text for additional details.
b The data to test hypotheses 6 and 7 include all cases in our sample but replace the appellant and appellee capability
typology variables with two dummy variables: the US appellant and US appellee. See the text for more details.
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APPENDIX B
Descriptive Statistics
Table B1. Descriptive Statistics for the Model of Attorney Expertise
Presented in Table 1
Table 1
Independent Variable Min Max Mean SD
Litigation team expertise 22.28 22.28 .01 1.00
Party capability 1 7 3.48 2.44
Opponent party capability 1 7 3.46 2.44
Salience 2.55 6.56 2.01 .99
Points of law 0 136 10.91 9.63
Economics 0 1 .40 . . .
Criminal case 0 1 .35 . . .
Table B2. Descriptive Statistics for the Models of the Likelihood of a Judge Vote
in Favor of the Appellant
Tables 2, 4, and 5 Table 3
Independent Variable Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD
Vote for appellant 0 1 .31 . . . 0 1 .33 . . .
Litigation team expertise 24.23 4.86 2.04 1.24 23.53 3.73 .12 1.17
Appellant capability 1 7 1.91 1.46 1 6 2.05 1.50
Appellee capability 1 7 4.32 1.86 1 6 3.26 1.66
Judge ideological congruence 2.58 .58 2.04 .44 2.58 .58 2.03 .43
Panel ideological congruence 2.57 .57 2.05 .40 2.57 .57 2.03 .39
Circuit ideological congruence 2.52 .52 2.10 .34 2.52 .52 2.09 .33
Supreme Court ideological congruence 2.12 .12 2.03 2.08 2.12 .12 2.03 .08
Economic 0 1 .38 .49 0 1 .51 . . .
Criminal 0 1 .38 .49 0 1 .13 . . .
US appellant 0 1 .06 . . .
US appellee 0 1 .47 . . .
Salience 2.55 6.56 2.02 1.01
Points of law 0 136 10.15 9.08
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APPENDIX C
Table C1. Model of Attorney Quality as a Function of Party Capability,
1997–2002: Different Versions of Attorney Expertise without Index
Experience
ðOLSÞ
Team Size
ðOLSÞ
Law School
Quality ðLogistic
RegressionÞ
Party capability .22*** .25*** .07**
ð.01Þ ð.04Þ ð.02Þ
Opponent party capability .07*** .13** .03
ð.01Þ ð.04Þ ð.02Þ
Salience .05 .34*** .19***
ð.02Þ ð.09Þ ð.04Þ
Points of law .00 .04** .02***
ð.00Þ ð.01Þ ð.00Þ
Economic 2.002 .65*** .18
ð.056Þ ð.11Þ ð.10Þ
Criminal .43*** 2.51*** 2.35**
ð.06Þ ð.10Þ ð.11Þ
Constant .84*** .57 21.71***
ð.08Þ ð.34Þ ð.15Þ
Adjusted R 2 .14 .09
Nagelkerke R 2 .034
Observations 4,006 4,043 4,092
Note.—Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
Table C2. Model of Attorney Quality as a Function of Party
Capability, 1997–2002: Different Measures of Attorney
Quality Party Capability Dummy Variables
Coefficient
Individual 21.06***
ð.06Þ
Interest group 2.75***
ð.11Þ
Small business 2.77***
ð.05Þ
Local government 2.86***
ð.077Þ
Big business 2.68***
ð.06Þ
State government 2.69***
ð.10Þ
Opponent individual 2.33***
ð.06Þ
92
This content downloaded from 141.166.176.015 on December 19, 2016 12:37:21 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Table C2 (Continued )
Coefficient
Opponent interest group 2.27*
ð.11Þ
Opponent small business 2.25***
ð.06Þ
Opponent local government 2.36***
ð.08Þ
Opponent big business 2.20**
ð.07Þ
Opponent state government 2.45***
ð.09Þ
Salience .15***
ð.02Þ
Points of law .01***
ð.00Þ
Economic .12*
ð.05Þ
Criminal 2.21***
ð.05Þ
Constant .82***
ð.08Þ
Adjusted R 2 .16
Observations 3,994
Note.—United States is the reference category. Robust clustered
standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
Table C3. Model of Likelihood of a Judge Vote in Favor of
the Appellant as a Function of Attorney Capability and Party
Capability, 1997–2002: Different Versions of Attorney
Expertise without Index
Coefficient
Litigation experience 2.02
ð.02Þ
Litigation team size .19**
ð.07Þ
Law school prestige .10*
ð.05Þ
Appellant capability .11***
ð.02Þ
Appellee capability 2.12***
ð.02Þ
Judge ideological congruence .22*
ð.09Þ
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Table C3 (Continued )
Coefficient
Panel ideological congruence .26**
ð.10Þ
Circuit ideological congruence 2.04
ð.14Þ
Supreme Court ideological congruence 1.03*
ð.54Þ
Salience 2.01
ð.03Þ
Points of law 2.00
ð.00Þ
Economics .10
ð.09Þ
Criminal .18a
ð.10Þ
Constant 2.01
ð.17Þ
McKelvey and Zavoina R 2 .12
Observations 4,736
Note.—Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05 ðone-tailed testÞ.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
a Two-tailed test: p < .05; sign is in the unexpected direction.
Table C4. Model of Likelihood of a Judge Vote in Favor of
the Appellant as a Function of Attorney Capability and Party
Capability, 1997–2002: Party Capability Dummy Variables
Coefficient
Litigation team expertise .07**
ð.03Þ
Appellant individual 21.35***
ð.15Þ
Appellant interest group 21.82***
ð.25Þ
Appellant small business 21.72***
ð.16Þ
Appellant local government 2.89***
ð.23Þ
Appellant big business 21.97***
ð.27Þ
Appellant state government 21.62***
ð.21Þ
Appellee individual .59***
ð.13Þ
Appellee interest group 2.36
ð.24Þ
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Table C4 (Continued )
Coefficient
Appellee small business .32**
ð.12Þ
Appellee local government .26
ð.17Þ
Appellee big business .35
ð.22Þ
Appellee state government .03
ð.13Þ
Judge ideological congruence .23**
ð.09Þ
Panel ideological congruence .25**
ð.10Þ
Circuit ideological congruence .05
ð.14Þ
Supreme Court ideological congruence 1.81***
ð.56Þ
Salience .03
ð.03Þ
Points of law 2.00
ð.00Þ
Economics .28***
ð.10Þ
Criminal .00
ð.11Þ
Constant .81***
ð.16Þ
McKelvey and Zavoina R 2 .15
Observations 4,736
Note.—United States is the reference category. Robust clustered
standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05 ðone-tailed testÞ.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
Table C5. Logistic Regression US Influence on Likelihood
of Judge Vote for Appellant, No Litigation Team Expertise
Measure: Party Capability Dummy Variables
Coefficient
Appellant individual person 21.40***
ð.15Þ
Appellant interest group 21.85***
ð.26Þ
Appellant small business 21.75***
ð.16Þ
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Table C5 (Continued )
Coefficient
Appellant local government 2.91***
ð.23Þ
Appellant big business 21.98***
ð.264Þ
Appellant state government 21.66***
ð.21Þ
Appellee individual person .65***
ð.12Þ
Appellee interest group 2.30
ð.25Þ
Appellee small business .36***
ð.12Þ
Appellee local government .30*
ð.17Þ
Appellee big business .35
ð.22Þ
Appellee state government .065
ð.13Þ
Judge ideological congruence .22**
ð.09Þ
Panel ideological congruence .250**
ð.10Þ
Circuit ideological congruence .50
ð.14Þ
Supreme Court ideological congruence 1.77***
ð.56Þ
Salience .03
ð.03Þ
Points of law 2.00
ð.00Þ
Economics .28**
ð.10Þ
Criminal .02
ð.101Þ
Constant .82***
ð.16Þ
McKelvey and Zavoina R2 .15
Observations 4,736
Note.—Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05 ðone-tailed testÞ.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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Table C6. Logistic of US Influence on Likelihood of Judge
Vote for Appellant with Litigation Team Expertise Measure:
Different Versions of Attorney Expertise without Index
Coefficient
Litigation experience 2.01
ð.02Þ
Litigation team size .18*
ð.07Þ
Law school prestige .09
ð.05Þ
US appellant 1.58***
ð.14Þ
US appellee 2.32***
ð.09Þ
Judge ideological congruence .23**
ð.10Þ
Panel ideological congruence .26**
ð.10Þ
Circuit ideological congruence .02
ð.14Þ
Supreme Court ideological congruence 1.84***
ð.52Þ
Salience .00
ð.03Þ
Points of law 2.00
ð.00Þ
Economics .11
ð.08Þ
Criminal 2.02
ð.09Þ
Constant 2.30**
ð.11Þ
McKelvey and Zavoina R 2 .14
Observations 4,736
Note.—Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05 ðone-tailed testÞ.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
Table C7. Logistic Regression of Likelihood of Judge Vote for
Appellant, Cases without the United States as Litigant: Different
Versions of Attorney Expertise without Index
Coefficient
Litigation experience .09**
ð.03Þ
Litigation team size .18*
ð.11Þ
97
This content downloaded from 141.166.176.015 on December 19, 2016 12:37:21 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Table C7 (Continued )
Coefficient
Law school prestige .08
ð.08Þ
Appellant capability 2.02
ð.04Þ
Appellee capability 2.09**
ð.04Þ
Judge ideological congruence .16
ð.14Þ
Panel ideological congruence .49***
ð.15Þ
Circuit ideological congruence .27
ð.20Þ
Supreme Court ideological congruence 2.03
ð.76Þ
Salience .15***
ð.04Þ
Points of law .01*
ð.01Þ
Economics .06
ð.10Þ
Criminal 2.22
ð.17Þ
Constant .75**
ð.27Þ
McKelvey and Zavoina R2 .12
Observations 2,295
Note.—Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05 ðone-tailed testÞ.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
Table C8. Logistic Regression of Likelihood of Judge Vote for
Appellant, Cases without the United States as Litigant: Party
Capability Dummy Variables
Coefficient
Litigation team expertise .15***
ð.04Þ
Appellant interest group 2.07
ð.28Þ
Appellant small business 2.26a
ð.13Þ
Appellant local government .67**
ð.26Þ
Appellant big business 2.74a
ð.36Þ
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Table C8 (Continued )
Coefficient
Appellant state government .08
ð.22Þ
Appellee interest group 21.20***
ð.30Þ
Appellee small business 2.20
ð.15Þ
Appellee local government 2.33*
ð.20Þ
Appellee big business 2.13
ð.27Þ
Appellee state government 2.41*
ð.21Þ
Judge ideological congruence .17
ð.14Þ
Panel ideological congruence .45**
ð.15Þ
Circuit ideological congruence .27
ð.20Þ
Supreme Court ideological congruence .05
ð.78Þ
Salience .18***
ð.04Þ
Points of law .01
ð.01Þ
Economics .25
ð.13Þ
Criminal 2.29
ð.19Þ
Constant .28
ð.37Þ
McKelvey and Zavoina R2 .14
Observations 2,295
Note.—United States is the reference category. Robust clustered
standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05 ðone-tailed testÞ.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
a Two-tailed test: p < .05; the sign is in the unexpected direction.
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